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AECE-00 /146 W

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O P 051627Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1837

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 13 VIENNA 1932

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: MARCH 4 INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN MARCH 4 INFORMAL SESSION WHICH LASTED FOUR HOURS, ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY FRG REP, CANADIAN REP AND US REP, AND EAST BY SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY, GDR REP OESER AND POLISH REP STRULAK. EAST STAYED WITHIN AGREED GROUND RULES OF FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AND SHOWED SOMEWHAT MORE MOVEMENT THAN ANTICIPATED IN DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR OWN POSITION.

2. EASTERN REPS EMPHASIZED INEQUITY OF ALLIED PROPOSAL IN SUGGESTING THAT EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS BE APPLIED

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TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES DESPITE FACT THAT

SOVIET FORCES REPRESENTED HALF OF WARSAW PACT TOTAL AND US FORCES MUCH SMALLER PROPORTION OF NATO GROUND FORCES. SECOND MAIN EASTERN THEME WAS EMPHASIS ON PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS REVIEWED ARGUMENTS FOR FIRST PHASE CONSISTING OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS, SUMMARIZED THE NUMEROUS POINTS THEY HAD MADE THUS FAR CONCERNING SECOND PHASE AND PARTICIPATION OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, REJECTED EASTERN TERMINOLOGY SEEKING TO DIVIDE PARTICIPANTS INTO FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES, AND POINTED OUT THAT JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE DID NOT COMMIT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM OUTSET.

3. ALLIED REPS ALSO INTRODUCED (PARA 32 BELOW) CONCEPT OF FIXED PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN PHASES, WHICH ELICITED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST FROM EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES. LATTER POINTED OUT HOWEVER THAT ALLIED CONCEPT PROVIDED NO CERTAINTY AS TO WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IN SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCTIONS AND NO ASSURANCES AS TO THEIR OUTCOME. EASTERN REPS ALSO RAISED POSSIBILITY OF FORCE FREEZE BETWEEN PHASES (PARA 40). THEY CRITICIZED COMMON CEILING RATHER MILDLY AS INADEQUATE ANSWER TO VAGUENESS OF ALLIED SECOND PHASE AND INEQUITABLE BECAUSE IT DID NOT INCLUDE ALL FORCE ELEMENTS, AND APPEARED TO BE HINTING THAT THEY WOULD TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW IF "ALL FORCE ELEMENTS" WERE INCLUDED (PARAS 26, 56).

4. KHLESTOV SUGGESTED THAT, IN ORDER TO MEET ALLIED POINT ON DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND REDUCTION, ALL "FOREIGN" FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTION BE REDUCED IN A FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATION, WITH NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTION OF THOSE WITHIN THE AREA TO FOLLOW (PARA 55). KHLESTOV THEN INTRODUCED AS "CONTRIBUTION TO FLEXIBILITY" A MODIFIED VERSION OF EASTERN FIRST STAGE PROPOSAL (PARAS 61-67). UNDER THIS VERSION, EACH SIDE WOULD REDUCE BY 20,000 BUT EACH SIDE WOULD DETERMINE, PRESUMABLY INDEPENDENTLY, PROPORTION OF THIS TOTAL TO BE TAKEN BY EACH OF ITS PARTICIPANTS. ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE.

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THERE WOULD BE NO NATIONAL CEILINGS, BUT ONLY A SINGLE CEILING ON BOTH SIDES, PLUS A LIMITATION ON INCREASE OF FORCES FROM THE OUTSIDE. THIS COULD ALSO TAKE FORM OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT BUT IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE PARALLEL TO CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIES REPS CRITICIZED THIS VERSION AS IMPLYING ACCEPTANCE OF PRESENT IMBALANCE OF FORCES AND IGNORING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND REDUC-

TIONS, AS WELL AS NEED OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS FOR REASSURANCE ARISING FROM INITIAL US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. KHESTOV EMPHASIZED NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND SUGGESTED ALLIES SHOULD THINK UP NEW VARIANT IF THIS ONE DID NOT SUIT THEM. EAST DID NOT BRING UP ISSUE OF SOVIET OR US PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II. THERE WAS INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF PRESS LEAKS, WITH REPRESENTATIVES

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OMB-01 /146 W

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O P 051627Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1838

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

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OF EACH SIDE ACCUSING OTHER OF OVER-STEPPING AGREED BOUNDS.
IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT SESSION ON MARCH 7. END SUMMARY.

5. AFTER ALLIED REPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUSLY
AGREED TACTIC HAD INDICATED TO KHESTOV THAT HE
SHOULD SPEAK FIRST, KHESTOV SAID THAT EASTERN
REPS CONSIDERED THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION
A VERY USEFUL EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS. MOST USEFUL
ASPECT OF THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HAD BEEN THE INCREASED

UNDERSTANDING THE SESSION HAD BROUGHT WITH REGARD TO THE WESTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES. NOT ALL POINTS RAISED IN THAT DISCUSSION HAD BEEN PURSUED TO THE END, BUT IN THE EASTERN VIEW, SESSION HAD HAD EFFECT OF CONFIRMING THAT REDUCTION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES BY EQUAL PERCENTAGES WAS NOT AN EQUITABLE APPROACH. THE

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WESTERN APPROACH WAS LIMITED TO REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES. HOWEVER, AMERICAN GROUND FORCES WERE NOT A MAJOR PART OF THE TOTAL NATO GROUND FORCE; ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE, THE SOVIETS WERE. THIS WHOLE MATTER SHOULD BE APPROACHED JUSTLY. TWO MILITARY GROUPS WERE REPRESENTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS -- NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. THE WEST WAS PROPOSING REDUCTION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET FORCES BY THE SAME PERCENTAGE EVEN THOUGH EACH FORCE DID NOT REPRESENT THE SAME PROPORTION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES. AN APPROACH OF THIS KIND WOULD BE FAIR IF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES REPRESENTED THE SAME PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL FORCE ON EACH SIDE. HOWEVER, WESTERN FIGURES DEMONSTRATED THAT AMERICAN FORCES WERE LESS THAN ONE-HALF OF SOVIET FORCES. YET WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE SUGGESTING EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANT IN EFFECT THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES STATIONED IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE REDUCTION AREA, POLAND, GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WOULD BE COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE FOR THE WEST. AMERICAN GROUND FORCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE ALL THE FOREIGN FORCES IN THE NATO TERRITORY WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. OTHER OUTSIDE NATO FORCES WERE REPRESENTED THERE. THIS WAS INEQUITABLE.

6. KHESTOV SAID THAT A FURTHER INEQUITABLE ASPECT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WAS THAT WESTERN REDUCTION SUGGESTIONS AFFECTED THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR. HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, ONLY THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE FRG AND OF ALL NATO TERRITORY WAS AFFECTED SINCE THIS WAS THE PLACE WHERE US FORCES WERE LOCATED.

6. KHESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO GIVE A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF THE INEQUITY OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD PROPOSED THE REDUCTION OF AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY IN THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR. THIS TANK ARMY WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR WHERE IT WAS OPPOSED ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LINE BY FRG BUNDESWEHR FORCES. THE LATTER WOULD NOT BE COVERED BY THE

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PROPOSED REDUCTIONS. THUS, IN THE NORTH, WHERE THE BUNDES-WEHR CONFRONTED THE SOVIET TANK ARMY AND GDR FORCES, THE SOVIETS WERE EXPECTED TO REDUCE AND THUS WEAKEN THE WHOLE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE AREA, WHILE AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN ONLY FROM THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE FRG.

8. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOT COVER ALL OTHER IN-EQUITIES IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, IF THE WEST WERE WILLING TO REDUCE THE BUNDESWEHR AND THE GDR FORCES BY 15 PERCENT, THEN IT PROBABLY WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REDUCE BY THE SAME PERCENTAGE THE GROUND FORCES OF US AND SOVIETS. THESE WERE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH HAD OCCURRED TO EASTERN REPS FOLLOWING LAST SESSION. THEY SHOWED WHY EASTERN REPS THOUGHT THE SEARCH FOR A MUTUAL ACCEPTABLE APPROACH FOR REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAD NOT YET BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND HAD TO BE PURSUED FURTHER. THERE WERE AFTER ALL TWO GROUPS OF FORCES IN THE ARE OF REDUCTIONS CONSISTING ON THE ONE HAND OF FOREIGN FORCES AND ON THE OTHER OF NATIONAL FORCES. THE INTERLOCKING COMPLEX OF BOTH FORCES MADE UP THE TOTAL POTENTIAL OF BOTH SIDES. ALL MILITARY ASPECTS WERE PART OF A TOTAL SYSTEM ON EACH SIDE. HE WOULD NOT SPEAK ON THIS OCCASION ABOUT OTHER FORCE ELEMENTS AS THIS WAS RELATED TO THE NEXT TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION. HOWEVER, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE VARIOUS GROUND FORCES REPRE
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OMB-01 /146 W

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O P 051627Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1839
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
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BEEN TO DETERMINE THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER LONG DISCUSSION, A CERTAIN UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN ACHIEVED THAT THE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS WOULD HAVE CERTAIN RIGHTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WOULD BE PARTICIPATING IN REDUCTIONS AND THAT OTHERS WOULD NOT. OF COURSE, AT THAT TIME THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE EAST HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE STATED VIEWS OF LEADERS OF NATO COUNTRIES THAT THEIR FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO DISCUSS THE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

11. HOWEVER, KHLESTOV CONTINUED, THE PHRASE "MUTAL REDUCTIONS" MEANT THAT ALL ELEVEN COUNTRIES SHOULD TAKE PART. THE PHRASE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS DID NOT MEAN THAT ONLY TWO COUNTRIES

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SHOULD REDUCE, WHILE THE OTHER NINE OBSERVED THE PROCESS. THIS WAS WHY THE EAST CONSIDERED AN APPROACH BASED ON REDUCING UNEQUAL PROPORTIONS OF THE TOTAL FORCES OF EACH SIDE BY EQUAL PERCENTAGES AND AN APPROACH AIMED AT REDUCING ONLY ONE COMPONENT ON EACH SIDE WAS NOT FAIR OR JUST. IF ALL PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO PARTICIPATE IN DETENTE, THEN IT WAS UP TO THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH WOULD COVER BOTH NATIONAL AND FOREIGN ARMED FORCES. THIS WOULD BE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACH WHICH WOULD NOT DAMAGE THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE.

12. FRG REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT IN RESPONSE THAT ALLIED REPS AGREED WITH FACT THAT LAST SESSION HAD BEEN USEFUL. HE WAS SURE THESE SESSIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE USEFUL. ALLIED REPS HAD LISTENED WITH ATTENTION TO KHLESTOV'S COMMENTS. HE WOULD LIKE TO LEAD OFF IN REPLY.

13. FIRST, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT KHLESTOV HAD CONSISTENTLY SPOKEN OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES. THIS WAS NOT THE TERMINOLOGY AGREED IN THE PRE-

LIMINARY TALKS. THE ONLY DISTINCTION AGREED THEN WAS BETWEEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND PARTICIPANTS WITH SPECIAL STATUS. THE ONLY DISTINCTION ACCEPTABLE TO NATO COUNTRIES FOR THEIR PART WAS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE HAND AND THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER. ALLIED REPS BELIEVED US-SOVIET FORCES WERE IN FACT A SPECIAL CATEGORY BECAUSE THEY REPRESENTED THE FORCES OF TWO WORLD POWERS WHO WERE THE MAJOR POWERS IN EACH OF THE ALLIANCES AND WHO WERE THE WORLD'S MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE NUMERICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET FORCES AND OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE WAS DIFFERENT THAN BETWEEN THE US AND REMAINING NATO FORCES. THIS FACT MEANT THAT SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WERE LARGER THAN US FORCES. THE FACT THAT THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF US FORCES WITHIN THE NATO TOTAL AND SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT TOTAL WERE UNEQUAL IN SIZE WAS FROM THE WEST EUROPEAN

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VIEWPOINT A CAUSE OF SPECIAL CONCERN.

14. FRG REP NOTED THAT KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED THE BUNDESWEHR AS THE NUMERICALLY LARGEST FORCE OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE WESTERN SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. HE WISHED TO SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT, FROM VIEWPOINT OF THE FRG, SHARED BY ITS ALLIES, THE BUNDESWEHR HAD THE SAME STATUS AND ROLE AS THE FORCES OF ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY SPECIAL ROLE OR DESIGNATION FOR THE BUNDESWEHR WHICH DISTINGUISHED IT FROM THE REMAINING NATO FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SOVIET REP HAD SAID A JUST, FAIR AND REALISTIC APPROACH WAS NEEDED. ALLIED REPS AGREED WITH THIS VIEW.

IN THE ALLIED VIEW, A JUST AND FAIR APPROACH WAS THE ONE WHICH FORESAW TWO PHASES OF REDUCTIONS AND FORESAW AS THE FINAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON CEILING, I.E., APPROXIMATE PARITY FOR GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

15. FRG REP POINTED OUT THAT SOV REP HAD MENTIONED IT WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL TO HAVE ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REDUCE THEIR FORCES WHILE OTHERS LOOKED ON. THIS WAS NOT THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD IN MANY PLENARY STATEMENTS MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEWS ON THE TWO-PHASE PROGRAM AND ON PARTICIPATION OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. HE WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW WHAT THE ALLIES HAD SAID ON THIS SUBJECT IN ORDER TO

DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF ALLIED INTENT TO
HAVE TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS. FRG REP CONTINUED
WITH POINTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED IN AD HOC GROUP AS
FOLLOWS: ALLIED PARTICIPANTS HAD SPECIFIED THE
OVERALL REDUCTION GOAL AS A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND
FORCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITIES.
ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN A SUGGESTED NUMBER OF 700,000
FOR THAT COMMON CEILING. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD
IDENTIFIED THE CURRENT OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCES
ON BOTH SIDES. THIS PROVIDED THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS
OF THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED FOR BOTH FORCES. THE ALLIES
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HAD IDENTIFIED US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS.
THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED FIRST PHASE REDUCTION IN BOTH
SOVIET AND US FORCES (68,000 SOVIET; 29,000 US). THE
ALLIES HAD SAID PHASE II SHOULD COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO
AN AGREED COMMON CEILING. THE ALLIES HAD SAID PHASE I
AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION CONTAINING A
COMMITMENT TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED
REPRESENTATIV
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OMB-01 /146 W
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ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD INDICATED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE COMMON CEILING. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD INDICATED THAT BOTH THEIR CURRENT TOTAL OF WESTERN FORCES AND THE FIGURE THEY HAVE SUGGESTED FOR THE COMMON CEILING INCLUDE THE FRENCH FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

16. IN ALLIED VIEW, TAKEN CUMULATIVELY, THESE POINTS PROVIDED A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AS REGARDS REDUCTIONS UNDER WESTERN PROPOSALS.

17. CANADIAN REP NOTED THAT SOVIET REP HAD JUST MADE POINT THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. CANADIAN REP HAD RAISED THIS SUBJECT IN BILATERAL CONVERSATION SOME WEEKS AGO. HE CONSIDERED THE

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POSITION HE HAD THEN TAKEN TO BE CORRECT. IT WAS ONE ENDORSED BY HIS COLLEAGUES.

18. CANADIAN REP CONTINUED ON LINES PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED BY AD HOC GROUP: IT HAS BEEN ARGUED BY SOME EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON 14 MAY 1973 TO DESIGNATE 11 PARTICIPANTS AS "POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS" CONSTITUTED AN UNDERTAKING ON THE PART OF EACH OF THOSE 11 COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE REDUCTION OF FORCES; AND FURTHER THAT ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD THEREBY TAKEN UPON THEMSELVES THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY AND FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. ALLIES FAILED TO UNDERSTAND HOW SUCH INTERPRETATIONS CAN BE EXTRACTED FROM A PERFECTLY CLEAR AND STRAIGHTFORWARD DEFINITION. THE MEANING OF THE AGREED DESIGNATION IS SIMPLY THAT THE 11 COUNTRIES SO DESIGNATED ARE THOSE WHICH ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER BECOMING PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS MAY LEAD. WHETHER IN FACT THEY DO SO MUCH NATURALLY DEPEND UPON THE NATURE OF THOSE AGREEMENTS AND THEIR DETAILED PROVISIONS. HE COULD NOT IMAGINE THAT ANY OF THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH WE HERE REPRESENT COULD BIND THEMSELVES IN ADVANCE TO BE PARTIES TO AN AGREEMENT, THE CONTENT OF WHICH HAD NOT EVEN BEEN SKETCHED OUT, LET ALONE LAID DOWN IN DETAIL, AND THE TIMING OF WHICH COULD NOT BE FORESEEN. SUCH IS NOT THE PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENTS, AND UNDERSTANDABLY SO, PARTICULARLY SINCE ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION BY THE LEGISLATIVE ORGANS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED

AND GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT ENGAGE THEIR PARLIAMENTS
IN THIS WAY.

19. STILL LESS COULD THE AGREED DESIGNATION BE TAKEN TO
MEAN THAT THE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE ALL AGREED TO
TAKE PART IN REDUCTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND FROM THE
VERY BEGINNING. NOTHING THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS
SAID DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS, NOR IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR, CAN BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT THIS
IS THE CASE. NOR WERE ALLIES AWARE, WITH REFERENCE

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TO THE STATEMENT IN PLENARY ON 29 JANUARY BY THE
CZECHOSLOVAK REPRESENTATIVE, OF ANY MENTION BY THE
EASTERN DELEGATIONS DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS
OF THE NEED FOR SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

20. CANADIAN REP SAID HE ALSO WISHED TO POINT OUT
THAT THE DELEGATIONS OF WESTERN PARTICIPATING
GOVERNMENTS OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES HAVE AT NO
TIME SAID THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES
IN A SECOND PHASE. ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAVE MADE IT
CLEAR THAT FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS, WHICH WILL
COMPLETE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE COMMON CEILING. ALLIES
HAD BEEN EXHORTED TO GIVE AN INDICATION OF WHEN OTHER
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INTEND TO REDUCE THEIR
FORCES, AND TO WHAT EXTENT. THESE ARE OBVIOUSLY POINTS
WHICH REMAIN TO BE NEGOTIATED. HE COULD SIMPLY NOTE
HERE THAT WE ON THE WESTERN SIDE HAVE MADE THE ATTAINMENT
OF A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS A CENTRAL POINT OF OUR PROPOSALS. ALLIES
HAVE FURTHER SUGGESTED BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION THAT THE
COMMON CEILING MIGHT BE SET AT 700,000 MEN FOR THE
GROUND FORCES ON EACH SIDE. EASTERN REPS KNOW THE SIZE
OF REDUCTIONS IN US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WHICH WE
HAVE PROPOSED FOR THE FIRST PHASE; AND WE HAVE GIVEN
FIGURES OF THE PRESENT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTHS
ON BOTH SIDES. FROM THESE FACTS AND FIGURES, EAST COULD
JUDGE THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF THE SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS
WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED TO REACH A COMMON CEILING AT THE
LEVEL WE HAVE SUGGESTED. THE OVERALL COMMON CEILING
WOULD APPLY TO THE TOTAL OF GROUND FORCES OF EACH SIDE
IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. APPROPRIATE REDUCTIONS IN
PHASE 2 WOULD BE MADE IN THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS IN ORDER TO REACH THIS COMMON CEILING.

21. IT HAS ALSO BEEN SUGGESTED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL
TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ONLY IN A FIRST
PHASE WAS IN SOME WAY CONTRARY TO THE AGREED COMMUNIQUE

OF 28 JUNE 1973. HE WOULD REFER AGAIN TO THE STATEMENT
BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHO SAID ON

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29 JANUARY THAT THE EASTERN DEMAND THAT ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS BE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS FROM
THE VERY BEGINNING WAS BASED ON THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING
WHICH HAD EMERGED FROM THE PREPARATORY TALKS. HE TOOK
THE PHRASE "COMMON UNDERSTANDING" TO REFER TO THE
COMMUNIQUE.

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NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

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OMB-01 /146 W
----- 123549

O P 051627Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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22. NOW, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
DELEGATIONS FROM BOTH SIDES HAVE QUOTED THE AGREED
COMMUNIQUE TO JUSTIFY THEIR PROPOSALS. BUT THE

ARGUMENT TO WHICH HE HAD ADDRESSED HIMSELF IN THESE REMARKS WAS NOT BASED ON ANY PROVISION IN THE COMMUNIQUE, AND IS MOREOVER INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED TERMS OF THE COMMUNIQUE. THE FOLLOWING PHRASE WAS TO BE FOUND IN THE TEXT FORMALLY AGREED ON 28 JUNE 1973:

"THEY ALSO AGREED THAT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY."

THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF PHASING WAS SPECIFICALLY
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DESIGNED TO MEET THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN IN THAT SENTENCE, AND IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH IT. CERTAINLY THERE IS NOTHING IN THAT SENTENCE, OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE COMMUNIQUE, WHICH CAN POSSIBLY BE CITED TO JUSTIFY THE CLAIM THAT OUR PROPOSAL TO DIVIDE NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCTIONS INTO TWO PHASES IS CONTRARY TO ANY COMMON UNDERSTANDING WE MAY HAVE REACHED. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEAR TO OUR EASTERN COLLEAGUES FROM FORMAL WESTERN STATEMENTS DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS THAT ONE OF THE CARDINAL POINTS OF OUR POSITION WAS THE CONCEPT OF PHASING. THIS WAS STATED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, EXPLICITLY DURING PRESENTATIONS CONCERNING A POSSIBLE AGENDA FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT SHOULD, THEREFORE, HAVE COME AS NO SURPRISE THAT THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS TABLED ON 22 NOVEMBER 1973 INCLUDED PROVISION FOR BOTH NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCTIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN MORE THAN ONE PHASE.

23. CANADIAN REP CONCLUDED THAT, AT THE QUADRILATERAL MEETING ON 13 APRIL 1973, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV CONFIRMED, WITH REGARD TO THE TERM "POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS," THAT THAT THE WORD 'POTENTIAL' HAD THE SAME MEANING IN RUSSIAN AS IN ENGLISH, AND SAID HE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT ANY OBLIGATION, MORAL OR OTHERWISE, WAS UNDERTAKEN BY ADOPTION OF THIS DEFINITION.

24 KHLESTOV CONTESTED CORRECTNESS OF THIS INTERPRETATION. US DEP REP POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC DURING PREPARATORY TALKS. EAST HAD WANTED LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD HAVE INDICATED A COMMITMENT BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE MERELY BY FACT OF PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WEST HAD REFUSED. KHLESTOV WOULD BE WELL AWARE OF THIS.

25. POLISH REP SAID HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE COMMUNIQUE AS THIS PROCESS COULD END BY DESTROYING THE COMMUNIQUE AS A COMMON DOCUMENT. HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE AGREED SUBJECT OF TODAY'S SESSION-- THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE SOVIET REP HAD INDICATED THE REASONS WHY EASTERN
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REPS BELIEVED IT DESIRABLE TO INCLUDE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN REDUCTIONS. LEAVING ASIDE THE WESTERN UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE, THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WAS RECOGNIZED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS. FROM THIS VIEWPOINT, IT MADE SENSE THAT, WHATEVER WAY REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE STARTED, THIS PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE RESPECTED. THEREFORE, ONE COULD NOT SIMPLY TAKE AS BASIS FOR THE FIRST REDUCTIONS, ONE-HALF OF THE FORCES OF ONE SIDE AND ONE-QUARTER OF THE FORCES OF THE OTHER. WHATEVER WAY REDUCTIONS MIGHT START, IT MUST BE ASSURED THAT THE APPROACH USED WAS EQUITABLE; ONLY IN THIS WAY WOULD PARTICIPANTS BE SURE THAT SECURITY WAS NOT DIMINISHED.

26 POLISH REP COMMENTED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD STRESSED THEIR INTEREST IN REDUCING THE SINGLE LARGEST FORCE ELEMENT ON THE EASTERN SIDE. THE EASTERN REPS HAD EQUALLY JUST RIGHT TO ASSURE THAT THE SINGLE LARGEST ELEMENT ON THE WESTERN SIDE WAS COVERED BY REDUCTIONS. ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED, DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS AND VARIANTS COULD BE FOUND IN THIS REGARD. BUT NONE SHOULD BRING ABOUT A DIMINUTION OF SECURITY. EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED ABOUT REDUCTION OF FORCES OTHER THAN AMERICAN ON THE NATO SIDE. ALLIED REPS TRIED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEIR APPROACH PROVIDED CLARITY CONCERNING THE SECOND PHASE AND THAT THE COMMON CEILING WAS THE CENTRAL POINT IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. BUT THE VERY IDEA OF A COMMON CEILING WAS A CONTROVERSIAL ONE, THAT IS, A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES, IN THE WESTERN VIEW, DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING LED TO DISCUSSION OF THE DISPARITIES THE WESTERN SIDE HAD RAISED, BUT ALSO IN HIS VIEW TO A DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. IT WAS NOT EVIDENT THAT THE COMMON

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NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

OMB-01 /146 W

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O P 051627Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1842

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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CEILING LED TO PARITY. THE ALLIES SEPARATED
GROUND FORCES FROM OTHER FORCES AND CLAIMED
EQUALITY OF GROUND FORCES ALONE MEANT PARITY.
THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. WESTERN VIEWS ON THE REDUCTION
OF NATIONAL FORCES REMAINED UNCLEAR AND DOUBTFUL.
THEREFORE, IF IT WERE REALLY DESIRED TO ACHIEVE AGREE-
MENT AND ALLIES WANTED TO FIND AN EQUITABLE STARTING
POINT, ONE WAY WOULD BE MORE OR LESS EQUAL ON
BOTH SIDES AND THEN TO TALK ABOUT REDUCING THEM. THIS
WOULD BE REAL MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS. THERE WAS
NO POINT IN TALKING ABOUT MILITARY POTENTIALS SOME
PARTICIPANTS HAD OUTSIDE THE AREA, TO WHICH FRG REP HAD
MADE ALLUSIONS. IT WAS OBVIOUS IF ONE WANTED TO TRY TO
BRING THESE INTO THE RECKONING, NO AGREEMENT COULD
BE REACHED. ONE SHOULD TAKE COMPARABLE ELEMENTS
FROM BOTH SIDES FROM THE START. THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY

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IN THIS AS REGARDS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SINCE ALL THEIR DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO REDUCE. THIS WOULD BE A TRULY EQUITABLE APPROACH.

27. FRG REP SAID POLISH REP HAD AS IN PREVIOUS EASTERN REMARKS SPOKEN OF THE TWO SINGLE LARGEST ELEMENTS, SOVIET FORCES ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE AND THE BUNDESWEHR ON THE NATO SIDE. THIS WAS A FLATTERING COMPARISON BUT IT WAS NOT REALISTIC TO EQUATE THE BUNDESWEHR WITH SOVIET FORCES. HE HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT US AND SOVIET FORCES WERE IN A SPECIAL CATEGORY SINCE THEY REPRESENTED THE FORCES OF THE TWO MAJOR WORLD POWERS WHICH HAD CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OBVIOUSLY HAD WORLD-WIDE RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE FACTORS DID NOT APPLY TO THE BUNDESWEHR. POLISH REP HAD SAID THAT A COMMON CEILING FOR THE GROUND FORCES WAS CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE. HE HAD NOT SAID WHY. COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES WOULD BE AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR REAL STABILITY AND PERMANENT DETENTE IN EUROPE.

28. FRG REP SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND ARGUMENTS THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS UNFAIR OR WOULD DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES. IF WESTERN FIRST-PHASE PROPOSAL WERE CARRIED OUT, WARSAW PACT FORCES AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD STILL BE LARGER THAN THEY HAD BEEN SIX YEARS AGO BUT ON THE NATO SIDE THERE WOULD BE LESS NATO FORCES AND LESS US FORCES IN THE AREA THAN THERE HAD BEEN AT THAT TIME. IF HE UNDERSTOOD POLISH REP CORRECTLY, HE HAD NOT CONTESTED PARITY AS A DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE BUT HAD SAID THAT AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ALSO. DID THIS MEAN THAT THE WARSAW PACT CONSIDERED WESTERN AIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SO SUPERIOR IN NUMBERS THAT THEY MADE UP FOR THE SUPERIORITY OF THE WARSAW PACT IN GROUND FORCES AND TANKS? IF SO, THIS WAS NOT BORNE OUT BY THE FACTS. FRG REP SAID HE MERELY WISHED TO MAKE THIS POINT IN PASSING SINCE THE PRESENT TOPIC WAS GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

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29. GDR REP SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT GDR AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET FORCES FOR THE WARSAW PACT SIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY. THIS WAS WHY EASTERN REPS DEMANDED EQUIVALENT REDUCTIONS FROM BOTH SIDES. ALLIES REPS HAD PROPOSED A 15 PERCENT

REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. WHY SHOULDN'T ALL FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE REDUCE BY THE SAME PERCENTAGE? THIS WOULD LEAD TO A REDUCTION PROPORTIONAL TO THE STRENGTH OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCES ON BOTH SIDES. WITH REGARD TO REMARKS OF CANADIAN REP, HE HOPED THAT CANADIAN REP WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH A LEGAL POSITION. IN ORDER TO HAVE THE POSSIBILITY FOR SOME WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO DECLINE TO REDUCE. HE THEREFORE WISHED TO ASK WHETHER ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE WERE READY TO REDUCE AND TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN PROPORTION TO THEIR SIZE WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES. IT WAS NOT FAIR TO ASK THE FRG ALONE FOR THE BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS OR TO TREAT BUNDESWEHR IN ISOLATION. BUT WHAT ABOUT ALL PARTICIPANTS, WHAT ABOUT CANADA AND THE UK? WERE THEY READY TO UNDERTAKE A REDUCTION PROPORTIONATE TO THEIR STRENGTH IN RELATION TO FORCES ON THEIR SIDE?

30. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT HE WOULD NOT AGREE THAT IT WAS NOT THE TIME TO SPEAK OF THE TIMING OF REDUCTIONS OF OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. NO ONE COULD PREDICT WHEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A FINAL AGREEMENT. THE EAST HAD AT LEAST SUGGESTED A DEFINITE TIME TABLE FOR REDUCTIONS. IT WAS NOT CLEAR UNDER THE ALLIED CONCEPT WHEN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START AND WHEN THEY WOULD BE COMPLETED. CANADIAN REP HAD JUST QUOTED THE COMMUNIQUE STATEMENT THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY SHOULD BE OBSERVED IN EACH STAGE. ONE COULD NOT REDUCE A LARGE PART OF THE WARSAW PACT ALLIANCE AND ONLY A SMALL PART OF NATO'S AND MAINTAIN THIS PRINCIPLE. THE CENTRAL QUESTION REMAINED OF THE WILLINGNESS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE REDUCTIONS AND THE WHOLE QUESTION OF TIMING.

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31. POLISH REP SAID EASTERN REPS AGREED BUNDESWEHR SHOULD NOT HAVE SOME SPECIAL STATUS. ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE AND THERE SHOULD BE NOT SINGLING OUT. THE BUNDESWEHR HAD ONLY BEEN MENTIONED IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTS OF APPLYING WESTERN LOGIC TO THE POSITION OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBERS.

32. FRG REP SAID ALLIES HAD NEVER SAID THAT THEIR SOLE OBJECTIVE WAS REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES. IT WAS INCORRECT THAT ALLIED INTEREST IN REDUCTIONS WAS COMPLETELY VAGUE. ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD NEVER SAID THEY WOULD NOT WISH

TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES.
ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THEY AGREED TO COMMIT

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1844
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
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OUTSET? GDR REP ASKED WHETHER ALLIES MEANT THAT
20,000 ON EACH SIDE WAS TOO LITTLE AND THAT THEY
WOULD WISH TO INCREASE THIS NUMBER.

39. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. ALLIES
HAD UNDERSTOOD GDR REP TO MEAN A TOKEN PARTICIPATION
IN REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE
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PERCENT OF US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE.

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REDUCTIONS OF ONLY SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES,
WOULD OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BE PERMITTED TO
BUILD UP THEIR FORCES IN THIS PERIOD?

41. US REP SAID ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN EAST QUITE

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A NUMBER OF CLARIFICATIONS ABOUT THEIR SECOND PHASE CONCEPT. IN ADDITION TO THAT, HE COULD BE MORE PRECISE WITH REGARD TO SOME QUESTIONS KHLESTOV HAD ASKED ON PREVIOUS OCCASION AND WOULD PROCEED TO DO SO IN A MOMENT. BUT HE CONSIDERED IT ONLY FAIR IF PARTICIPANTS WERE TRYING TO HAVE A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION THAT THE EAST SHOULD SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF TWO-PHASE REDUCTIONS AND THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

42. PRESENTING POINT AGREED BY AD HOC GROUP, US REP SAID THAT ON THE LAST OCCASION KHLESTOV HAD RAISED A QUESTION CONCERNING THE TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS UNDER ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS COLLEAGUES US REP COULD REPLY, STILL ON INFORMAL BASIS THAT THIS WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT. OTHER ENVISAGED THAT THESE PROVISIONS WILL ESTABLISH AN AGREED TIMETABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE AGREED REDUCTIONS AND THE APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES AND WOULD PROVIDE THAT IMPLEMENTATION WILL START PROMPTLY AFTER THE AGREEMENT COMES INTO EFFECT. ALLIES BELIEVED THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US WITHDRAWALS TO BE MADE AS RAPIDLY AS SOVIET WITHDRAWALS. ALLIES BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO COMPLETE THEIR PHASE I WITHDRAWALS IN CONSIDERABLY LESS TIME THAN THE THREE-YEAR PERIOD SPECIFIED IN EASTERN PROGRAM. SO FAR AS ALLIES WERE CONCERNED, THEY WOULD BE READY TO REACH DURING 1974 A PHASE I AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. EAST ARE AWARE OF WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR THE CONTENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE TIMING WILL, OF COURSE, DEPEND ON HOW QUICKLY PARTICIPANTS COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE. EQUALLY, THE SOONER PARTICIPANTS WERE ABLE TO CONCLUDE A PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE SOONER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO START WITHDRAWING US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE PROVISIONS.

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45. GDR REP REPLIED THAT ANSWER WAS THAT THERE WAS AT PRESENT A BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE. THIS SHOULD BE RETAINED. PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE A PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS. ACCORDING TO HIS CALCULATIONS, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ENVISAGED A REDUCTION OF OVER 2 TO 1 IN THE FIRST PHASE AND 3.3 TO 1. IN THE SECOND PHASE.

46. POLISH REP COMMENTED THAT PARITY MEANT REAL PARITY AMONG ALL TYPES OF FORCES IN THE AREA. KHLESTOV SAID WHAT ABOUT THE SUB-CEILING FOR THE US AND SOVIETS? THIS WAS A NATIONAL CEILING BUT OTHER ALLIES APPARENTLY DID NOT WANT NATIONAL CEILINGS WHEN APPLIED TO THEMSELVES.

47. FRG REP SAID THERE WOULD BE COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR ALL FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. KHLESTOV SAID THAT LOGICALLY, COMMON CEILING SHOULD APPLY TO ALL FORCES WITH DISCRIMINATION. ALL SHOULD BE REDUCED PROPORTIONATELY. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE WORD "BALANCED" HAD BEEN DROPPED FROM THE TITLE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE WESTERN APPROACH CONTINUED TO BE BASED ON ITS "BALANCED", I.E., IN ACTUALITY UNBALANCED APPROACH. THIS WAS THE SAME
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ACTION ACDA-19

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SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01 /146 W

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O P 051627Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1844

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION 8 VICE 7)

OUTSET? GDR REP ASKED WHETHER ALLIES MEANT THAT
20,000 ON EACH SIDE WAS TOO LITTLE AND THAT THEY
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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-25 ACDE-00 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1845

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FROM US REP MBFR

48. CANADIAN REP SAID ALLIES HAD PROPOSED UNBALANCED REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED RESULT WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER STABILITY IN THE GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE A SITUATION OF REAL BALANCE WAS TO HAVE UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS.

49. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS A BASIC POINT. THE EAST WISHED TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. THE EASTERN PHILOSOPHY WAS THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES HAD BEEN HISTORICALLY DEVELOPED. BUT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAD OBSERVED THAT THE NUMERICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUND FORCES BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST HAD CHANGED TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF NATO OVER THE PAST YEARS.

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WHAT WERE THE HISTORICAL PROCESSES THAT HAD LED TO THIS OUTCOME? IF ONE LOOKED TO THE ACTUAL RECENT HISTORICAL PROCESSES, THE FRG HAD CONCLUDED IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND AND THE GDR. WESTERN REPS DID NOT AGREE THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES, WHICH HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY UNFAVORABLE TO

THE WEST IN RECENT YEARS, SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. WESTERN COUNTRIES COULD NOT SANCTION DISPARITY BY ACCEPTING IT AS THE FUTURE BASIS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. DISPARITIES WERE NOT A BASIS FOR STRENGTHENED PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE. PARITY, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS A REAL BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

50. KHLESTOV SAID WHY SHOULD ONE SPEAK OF DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES? ONE SHOULD EXAMINE THE FORCES AS A WHOLE. FRG REP SAID HE BELIEVED THAT EVEN WHEN OTHER ASPECTS WERE CONSIDERED, THE ASSESSMENTS HE HAD MENTIONED WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED.

51. GDR REP SAID THAT THE WESTERN TWO PHASE CONCEPT LEFT THE GROUND FORCES OF SIX DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT ANY EVIDENT PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS. THE EASTERN REPS WERE INTERESTED IN A GENERAL RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. IT WAS UP TO ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THIS WOULD BE AN ENCOURAGEMENT FOR ALL IF THEY WERE TO DO SO.

52. US REP SAID THAT IF REDUCTIONS START WITH US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT DURING THE PRESENT YEAR. IMPLEMENTATION BY THE US WOULD BE AS FAST AS THE SOVIETS. THIS STEP WOULD ESTABLISH MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND MAKE IT EASIER TO GET ON WITH THE REDUCTION OF OTHER FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS A PRACTICAL WAY TO ACHIEVE RESULTS. THE WEST WAS NOT ASKING THE EAST TO RELAY ON PURE FAITH AS REGARDS PHASE II. THE WEST HAD MADE A LARGE NUMBER OF POINTS QUITE CLEAR AS REGARDS PHASE II. WESTERN REPS WOULD LIKE TO HEAR SOME INDICATION OF EASTERN INTEREST IN THEIR APPROACH.

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53. SOVIET REP SAID EAST HAD DIFFERENT OPINIONS AS REGARDS DISPARITIES. BUT THE ISSUE OF HOW TO REDUCE WAS NOT THE ONLY ONE INVOLVED. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE WEST WISHED ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. BUT THE QUESTION OF WHEN TO START REDUCTIONS WAS NOT THE SAME AS THE QUESTION OF HOW TO REDUCE. THE DISCUSSION OF HOW TO REDUCE HAD BROUGHT DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT DISPARITIES AND HAD NOT RESOLVED DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION. BUT ALLIED REPS HAD NOT GIVEN A CONVINCING REPLY AS TO WHY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT START THE REDUCTION PROCESS TOGETHER. WHY NOT? ALLIED REPS HAD SAID IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO REDUCE EUROPEAN FORCES. IF THE AMOUNT PROPOSED BY THE EAST WAS TOO

LARGE FOR INITIAL WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS, THEN ONE SHOULD START WITH SMALLER FIGURES. THERE WAS NO REPLY FROM THE ALLIES ON WHY ALL COULD NOT REDUCE TOGETHER. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY TO FIND SOME WORKABLE COMPROMISE ON THIS ISSUE.

54. US REP SAID THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF CONFIDENCE BASED ON THE HISTORY OF THE PAST. WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS NATURALLY WISHED TO SEE SOVIET UNION TAKE THE FIRST STEP. SOVIET UNION HAD LONG EMPHASIZED WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM OUTSIDE AREA. WHY WAS THERE NOW SUCH EMPHASIS ON FORCES INSIDE IT? MOREOVER, THE US REP CONTINUED, THERE WAS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWING FORCES AND REDUCING THEM. THE LATTER WAS MORE DIFFICULT. IT WOULD HELP TACKLE THIS TASK WITH MORE CONFIDENCE IF A PHASE OF US-SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE.

55. KHRISTOV SAID ALLIED REPS HAD RAISED OBJECTIONS TO THE TERMINOLOGY "FOREIGN FORCES." BUT IT HAD TO BE SAID THAT AS REGARDS FOREIGN FORCES, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEIR REDUCTIONS WOULD AT LEAST TAKE PLACE UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AND WOULD NOT POSE THE
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O P 051627Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1846
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
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FROM US REP MBFR

WAS NOT A REASONABLE APPROACH. ONE SHOULD INVESTIGATE NEW POSSIBILITIES, ONE IN WHICH ALL WOULD HAVE THE SAME STATUS. EASTERN REPS WERE NOT SATISFIED. WITH ALLIED REMARKS ABOUT THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. UP TO NOW, THEY MEANT NOTHING AND CONSISTED OF VAGUE PROMISES TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT IN THE FUTURE. THE COMMON CEILING WAS NOT A SOLUTION SINCE IT WAS INTENDED TO APPLY ONLY TO GROUND FORCES. THE WEST WAS INEQUITABLY PROPOSING A NATIONAL CEILING FOR SOME COUNTRIES AND WAS PROPOSING INEQUITABLE REDUCTIONS. THE WEST WAS SAYING NOTHING ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. IT WAS ONLY WILLING TO UNDERTAKE OBLIGATION TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT IN THE SECOND PHASE AND THIS MEANT NOTHING. THE WEST WANTED A PRECISE AGREEMENT WITH FIGURES AND
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DETAILS FOR THE FIRST PHASE, WITH FIXED OBLIGATIONS, BUT WAS UNWILLING TO GIVE THE EAST ANYTHING AS REGARDS SIMILAR PRECISION FOR THE SECOND PHASE. THE COMMON CEILING WAS NO ANSWER TO ALL OF THESE PROBLEMS.

57. FRG REP SAID ALLIES HAD SAID A GOOD DEAL ABOUT PHASE II. WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES HAD TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS A POLITICAL UNION BY 1980. A POLITICAL UNION ONLY MADE SENSE IF IT RETAINED THE FREEDOM TO HAVE UNITY IN THE IMPORTANT AREA OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. IF THE EAST INSISTED ON ESTABLISHING NATIONAL CEILINGS, THIS WOULD LIMIT THE FREEDOM OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TO DISPOSE THEIR DEFENSES AS THEY DESIRED IN THE FUTURE. WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WOULD HONOR THE COMMON CEILING, BUT COLLECTIVELY. THE EAST COULD NOT EXPECT TO LIMIT THE FREEDOM OF WESTERN EUROPE FOR THE FUTURE. US REP COMMENTED ALLIES WERE ONLY ASKING FOR CEILINGS ON US-SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE AREA, NOT ON THEIR TOTAL FORCES WHICH WOULD BE CASE WITH FORCES OF COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA. AND EVEN SO, IT WAS NOT STRICTLY A CEILING, BUT A LIMITATION ON ENTRY ON ADDITIONAL FORCES ONCE FORCES WITHIN THE AREA HAD BEEN REDUCED. KHLESTOV COMMENTED THAT WARSAW PACT COULD ALSO CLAIM THEY WISHED TO ESTABLISH A POLITICAL UNION. FRG REP REPLIED THAT WEST HAD NEVER SUGGESTED NATIONAL CEILINGS ON CZECH, GDR OR POLISH FORCES.

58. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, AS REP OF DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING COUNTRY WHICH HAD ALREADY VOLUNTARILY REDUCED ITS FORCES IN EUROPE BY ONE-HALF, HE WANTED TO STRESS THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

HE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT THAT US AND SOVIETS SHOULD SHOW THE WAY TO AGREEMENT IN A SECOND PHASE WHERE THE FOCUS WOULD BE ON OTHER PARTICIPANTS. A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS WAS IMPORTANT TO ALLIED PARTICIPANTS. IT MEANT MOVEMENT TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A COMMON CEILING WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A STABLE BASES FOR UNDERSTANDING IN CENGAL EUROPE. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CANADA MIGHT NOT BE IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON DETENTE, BUT REDUCTIONS BY

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SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE VITAL IN THAT SENSE. AN ALLIED COMMITMENT TO PROCEED TO A SECOND PHASE WAS MORE THAN AN EMPTY FORMULATION. IT MEANT A COMMITMENT TO PROCEED TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

59. GDR REP SAID EASTERN REPS VIEWED POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AS A SIGNIFICANT DIMINUTION OF GDR SECURITY. ACROSS THE LINE FROM THE GDR WERE UK AND FRG FORCES IN THE FRG, AND THESE WERE NOT GOING TO BE WITHDRAWN. THIS CREATED A FEELING OF CONCERN IN GDR. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT EASTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD REGARD FAVORABLY INITIAL PHASE COMPOSED OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS. POLISH REP SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE IN THE PROPORTIONS SEEN BY THE WEST. US REP SAID THAT APPARENTLY GDR REP WAS UNAWARE THAT SOME US FORCES WERE STATIONED IN PART OF FRG NEAR EAST GERMANY. HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THE WEST DID NOT WISH TO PLACE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET CAPACITY TO REDEPLOY ITS FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA. THE WEST HAD REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL OF THE THIRD SHOCK ARMY BECAUSE THIS UNIT HAD SO MANY TANKS. BUT THE WEST DID NOT SUGGEST RELOCATION OF SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE AREA. THE CEILINGS ALLIES HAD MENTIONED HAD TO DO WITH LIMITING ENTRY OF FURTHER FORCES INTO THE AREA.

60. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO UNDERSTAND WESTERN POSTION BETTER. DID IT MEAN SOVIET AUTHORITIES COULD DECIDE WHICH FORCES THEY WISHED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA AND THAT SOVIET FORCES COULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM GDR AND ALSO FROM POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. US REP SAID NO, THAT ALLIES WISHED THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW A SPECIFIC TANK ARMY FROM THE GDR. BUT THE ALLIES DID NOT WISH TO SUGGEST ANY PROVISIONS PREVENTING RELOCATION OF SOVIET FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA.

61. SMIRNOVSKY SAID WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS TO START REDUCTIONS WITH US AND SOVIET FORCES AND HAD EMPHASIZED THE POLITICAL

AND PUBLIC OPINION IMPORTANCE OF SUCH AN ACTION.

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WESTERN REPS HAD ALSO ASSERTED SUCH REDUCTIONS WERE
SIMPLER THAN OTHER REDUCTIONS, BUT HE WOULD LIKE
TO DRAW WESTERN ATTENTION TO IDEA OF SYMBOLIC
REDUCTIONS. SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE GREAT IMPACT
AND WOULD

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OMB-01 /146 W

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O P 051627Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1847

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

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CREATE A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR FURTHER PROGRESS.
THIS WOULD ALSO CREATE A SOLUTION TO THE OVERALL
PROBLEM AND REPRESENT THE SIMPLEST STEP WHICH

COULD BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME.

62. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD PERMIT DROPPING IDEA OF NATIONAL CEILINGS. EACH GROUP COULD DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW ITS REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN. THE ONLY CEILING WOULD BE THAT APPLIED TO THE TOTAL OF FORCES ON EACH SIDE. OTHER VARIANTS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE A LIMIT ON ENTRY OF FOREIGN TROOPS. THE FIRST STEP COULD BE SPECIFIC AND SEPARATE FROM SUGGESTED STAGES AND
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CONTAIN A PROVISION FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. HE WAS JUST THINKING ALOUD AS TO HOW THE JOB MIGHT BE DONE WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. SOME EXAMPLE WAS NEEDED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS. IT WOULD BE A GOOD STEP FOR A BEGINNING. THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONTINUE AND TRY TO TACKLE THE REMAINING MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

63. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT, THAT LEAVING ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, THIS PROPOSAL APPEARED BASED ON THE EASTERN VIEW THAT PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, IT LEFT OUT OF ACCOUNT NEED FOR US-SOVIET EXAMPLE TO CREATE CONFIDENCE IN OTHERS. HOWEVER, DESPITE SHORTCOMINGS IN CONTENT, THE SOVIET REP WAS INDICATING FLEXIBILITY AND THIS WAS A GOOD SIGN.

64. US REP SAID HE WISHED TO CLARIFY THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. ACCORDING TO KHLESTOV, EACH SIDE WOULD TAKE PART AND ALLOCATE REDUCTIONS AS IT SAW FIT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE PART. US REP SAID, ACCORDING TO THIS VERSION, THERE WOULD BE NO NATIONAL CEILINGS AND THERE WOULD BE A LIMITATION ON ENTRY OF OUTSIDE FORCES. FURTHERMORE, APPARENTLY THE AGREEMENT SOVIET REP HAD IN MIND WAS CONCEIVED AS A SEPARATE AGREEMENT AND WOULD PROVIDE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. SMIRNOVSKY COMMENTED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD IN PAST MENTIONED VARIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH EASTERN PROPOSALS. EASTERN REPS WERE TRYING TO MEET THEM.

65. FRG REP ASKED WHETHER EASTERN REPS MEANT THAT IF ANY GIVEN COUNTRY DECIDED TO REDUCE ONLY TWO SOLDIERS, EAST WOULD NOT OBJECT AS LONG AS ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE INVOLVED IN REDUCTIONS.

66. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT.
KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT ALL COUNTRIES WOULD PARTICIPATE AND
EACH GROUP SHOULD DECIDE ON ITS OWN REDUCTIONS. FRG
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REP ASKED IN WHAT WAY THIS PROPOSAL WAS DIFFERENT
FROM EASTERN FIRST STAGE AS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED.
KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT ORIGINAL EASTERN IDEA HAD BEEN
THAT PARTICIPATION IN THE FIRST ROUND OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE
PROPORTIONATE TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FORCES
OF EACH COUNTRY TO THE TOTAL OF ALLIANCE FORCES
ON ITS SIDE. THE DIFFERENCE IN THE PRESENT
PROPOSAL WAS THAT EACH GROUP OF COUNTRIES SHOULD
DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES HOW THEY WOULD REDUCE.

67. US DEP REP SAID, APPARENTLY, DESPITE ITS OTHER
SHORTCOMINGS, SOVIET PROPOSAL MEANT EAST WAS
ACCEPTING THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATING IN TWO PHASES.
KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY DENIES THIS WAS THE CASE.
THEY SAID THIS WAS READING TOO MUCH INTO THE
PROPOSAL. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS FIRST STAGE WOULD
BE PARALLEL TO CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATION.
US REP SAID EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN WESTERN
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP
IN THE AREA. THUS NOT PRODUCE STABILITY AND WOULD
INHIBIT FREEDOM TO MOVE TOWARD GREATER EQUALITY OF
GROUND FORCES IN FUTURE. AS ALLIED REPS HAD
INDICATED, THE WEST DID NOT WISH TO RELINQUISH
CAPACITY TO RAISE WESTERN GROUND FORCES TO A MORE
EQUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF
BOTH SIDES. THE REPS BELIEVED THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF
EQUALITY IN GROUND FORCES WOULD BE THE SINGLE MOST
IMPORTANT ELEMENT CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS STABILITY IN
THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA.

68. US REP NOTED, ON BASIS OF POINTS APPROVED BY
AD HOC GROUP, THAT IN LAST SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD NOTED
WESTERN POSITION THAT US GROUND FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN
EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND ASKED WHAT
THE WEST HAD IN MIND IN THIS REGARD. UNDER THE
PROPOSAL ALLIES HAD TABLED, THE WEST WOULD RETAIN THE
FREEDOM TO DECIDE WHICH FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN
AS INDIVIDUALS AND WHICH FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN
AS UNITS. ALIES FELT THE CIRCUMSTANCES FULLY
JUSTIFIED THIS POSITION. BUT EAST HAD ASKED ALLIED WHETHER
THE US WOULD SPECIFY WHAT FORCES IT WOULD WITHDRAW
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AND HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE. IN ALLIED VIEW, THE QUESTION OF HOW GROUND FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN UNDER PHASE I COULD BE SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED WOULD HAVE TO BE SETTLED BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF A WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT BEGINS. THE QUESTION OF THE FORM IN WHICH THIS COULD BE DONE WOULD, IN ALLIED VIEW, BE A SUBJECT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

69. US REP CONTINUED THAT EAST HAD ALSO ASKED ALLIES TO CONFIRM THAT FRENCH FORCES WERE INCLUDED IN ALLIED FIGURES. ALLIES WISHED TO CONFIRM THAT FRENCH FORCES ARE INDEED INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL FIGURES ALLIES HAVE GIVEN

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O P 051627Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1848

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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EAST. THEY ARE INCLUDED IN BOTH THE CURRENT TOTAL OF 777,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ON THE WESTERN SIDE AND IN THE 700,000 CEILING WHICH ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED AS THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THIS POINT, SMIRNOVSKY SHOOK HIS HEAD AND SAID IT WAS NOT SO.

70. US REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD IN PREVIOUS SESSION ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET FORCES REMAINING AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS AND WHETHER THERE WOULD BE EXCEPTIONS TO THESE LIMITATIONS. WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR STABILIZING MEASURES, DESIGNED TO MEET THIS POINT, WERE EXPLAINED IN THE STATEMENT IN PLENARY BY THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE ON 21 FEBRUARY. A MORE
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DETAILED ACCOUNT OF CERTAIN MEASURES RELATED TO MOVEMENTS AND EXERCISES HAD BEEN GIVEN IN THE STATEMENT BY THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON 28 FEBRUARY. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT. BUT WHAT ALLIES HAD SAID SO FAR HAS INDICATED THE WAY IN WHICH WE PROPOSE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM RAISED IN EASTERN QUESTION. AMBASSADOR BEHRENDT HAD ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE SECURITY OF THE FLANKS TO WHICH ALLIES INTENDED TO RETURN AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR FIRST PHASE APPROACH.

71. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO EXPRESS SOME VIEWS SO THAT HIS STATEMENTS WOULD NOT CREATE ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS. EASTERN REPS HAD EXPLAINED THE REASONS WHY THEY BELIEVED THAT IT WAS MORE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY TO INCLUDE ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA IN REDUCTIONS. DISCUSSION IN THE PRESENT SESSION HAD ONCE MORE CONFIRMED INEQUITY OF ALLIED APPROACH. EASTERN REPS SAW NO REASON TO FOLLOW AN APPROACH WHICH FAVORED THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND PERMITTED REMAINING WESTERN COUNTRIES NOT TO JOIN THE FIVE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD INDICATED THEY WERE WILLING TO REDUCE. HE COULD NOT AGREE WITH THE ARGUMENTS WESTERN REPS HAD ADVANCED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION.

72. CANADIAN REP ONCE MORE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS FOR PUBLIC OPINION. KHLESTOV SAID THE WISH OF THE EAST WAS THAT ALL COUNTRIES START SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH REDUCTION OF FORCES. THE IDEAS HE MENTIONED WERE WITHOUT COMMITMENT, "QUARLES-TYPE" IDEAS. THE EASTERN REPS HAD MERELY WANTED TO INDICATE THEIR READINESS TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS AND TO

TAKE INTO ACCOUNT PROBLEMS REACHED BY WESTERN REPS.
HE HOPED WESTERN REPS WOULD GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION
TO THE IDEAS HE HAD ADVANCED ON THIS OCCASION. THERE
MIGHT BE OTHER VARIANTS WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED. IN
ANY EVENT, WESTERN PROGRAM WAS NOT A JUST ONE, AS
AS EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED. ALL PARTICIPANTS
WOULD EITHER HAVE TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY OR LIMIT
THEMSLEVES REPEATING FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ON BOTH
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SIDES.

73. US REP SIAD EXCHANGE HAD BEEN PROFITABLE, BUT
HE WISHED TO BRING UP ONE FURTHER MATTER: AN
APPARENTLY INSPIRED PRESS LEAK IN THE MARCH 1
EDITION OF THE WIENER ZEITUNG WHICH HAD CHARACTERIZED
THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS AS FOCUSING ON AIR AND
NUCLEAR FORCES. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THESE
TALKS ARE CENTERING ON TOPICS SUCH AS "REDUCTION
OF NUCLEAR ARMS UNITS AND AIR FORCES OF ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS" AND REDUCTION OF BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL
FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. BELGIAN REP AND HE HAD
MET AT THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH KHLESTOV,
SMIRNOVSKY AND STRULAK AND HAD DISCUSSED THE DE-
SIRABILITY OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
SMIRNOVSKY HAD EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO AVOID DISTORTION.
THESE POINTS WERE ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. IT WAS IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST
TO TRY TO MAKE THESE SESSIONS PRODUCTIVE TO AVOID
THIS KIND OF LEAK.

74. KHLESTOV SAID THAT SINCE US REP HAD RAISED THE
ISSUE HE WOULD COMMENT ON IT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT
INTENDED TO. HE DID NOT WISH TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, BUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN
RAISED THE LAST TIME (BY US DEPREP) HE HAD NOTED THERE HAD BEEN
REPORTS IN WESTERN PRESS WHERE PLENARY STATEMENTS
BY A NUMBER OF REPS HAD BEEN DESCRIBED, FOR EXAMPLE,
WHEN FRG REP HAD SPOKEN RECENTLY, THE FOLLOWING DAY

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NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

OMB-01 /146 W

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O P 051627Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1849

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

THERE APPEARED IN THE FEDERAL GERMAN PRESS A RESUME OF HIS SPEECH. IN THE AMERICAN PRESS, THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF CURRENT ARTICLES CITING AMERICAN OFFICIALS GIVING A NUMBER OF FACTUAL OPINIONS CONTRARY TO THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ONE SUCH ARTICLE HAD STATED THAT THE WESTERN OUTLINE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN TABLED PRIOR TO THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT. SO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOT BEING FULLY OBSERVED BY THE WEST. HE DOUBTED WHETHER ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS HAD LAUNCHED THE ARTICLE IN THE AUSTRIAN PRESS WHICH THE US REP HAD MENTIONED. EAST WAS WILLING TO TAKE MEASURES, BUT THE MEASURES MUST BE RECIPROCATED. AN AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENTIALITY HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE SPRING, BUT
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HAD NOT BEEN OBSERVED BECAUSE OF LEAKS IN THE WESTERN PRESS AND THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS MUCH THE SAME.

75. FRG REP SAID WEST FOLLOWED THE PRACTICE OF ONLY

MENTIONING TO THE PRESS NAMES OF REPS WHO SPOKE, WITH NO DETAILS ON THE CONTENT. HE HAD NOT SEEN COVERAGE IN THE GERMAN PRESS OF HIS PRESENTATION ON STABILIZATION MEASURES. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE AS REGARDS THE RECENT STATEMENT OF GDR REP; MAIN CONTENT OF LATTER'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN ACCURATELY SUMMARIZED BY THE AUSTRIAN NEWS AGENCY. EASTERN REPS COULD ASSUME THAT WESTERN REPS HAD NOT GIVEN THIS INFORMATION TO THE PRESS SINCE IT WAS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST.

76. FRG REP SAID HE WISHED TO BRING UP ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE PRESS. EASTERN PRESS AND PUBLIC MEDIA WERE CARRYING OUT A CAMPAIGN AGAINST WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. RADIO MOSCOW HAD ACCUSED FRG OF POISONING THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS AND HAD URGED 30 PERCENT REDUCTIONS OF THE BUNDESWEHR. THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT MAKE FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FRG.

77. KHLESTOV SAID AS REGARDS CONFIDENTIALITY OF TREATMENT OF TALKS, EVERY MORNING EASTERN REPS FOUND REPORTS IN THE WESTERN PRESS WHICH INTERPRETED THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A WAY WHICH INDICATED THEIR INFORMATION CAME FROM THE WESTERN DELEGATES. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN HUNGARIAN REP PETRAN SPOKE, THERE WERE ARTICLES IN WESTERN PRESS THAT PETRAN HAD MADE A STATEMENT AND SAID NOTHING NEW. SUCH DISTORTED REMARKS COULD ONLY COME FROM PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SO IF WESTERN REPS WANTED TO REDUCE PRESS LEAKAGE, EASTERN REPS COULD ONLY WELCOME IT. BUT, NONETHELESS, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THIS LEAKAGE HAD STARTED IN THE SPRING, MAINLY IN THE WESTERN PRESS. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, AS REGARDS NATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY, THIS WAS NOT AN AFFAIR OF VIENNA REPS. FRG REP MIGHT NOT LIKE COMMENTARY ON MOSCOW RADIO, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND FRG PUBLIC MEDIA WERE CARRYING COMPLETELY FALSE RUMORS ABOUT BUILD-UP OF
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SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE. FRG REP SAID THAT OFFICIAL FRG SPOKESMAN HAD DENIED THESE RUMORS.

78. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT FOR EXAMPLE, THERE HAD BEEN PRESS STORIES IN WESTERN PRESS CARRYING STATEMENTS BY GEN. SEJNA. WHO COULD BE BLAMED FOR SUCH STATEMENTS? THOSE RESPONSIBLE KNEW OF THEIR OWN ACTIONS. AS FAR AS PRESS COMMENTARY WAS CONCERNED, HIS OWN EFFORT WAS TO TRY TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING IN A BUSINESS-LIKE ATMOSPHERE. BUT AS FAR AS PRESENTATION OF FACTS DRAWN FROM NEGOTIATIONS WAS CONCERNED, THIS HAD BEEN STARTED BY THE WESTERN PRESS

REPS LIKE QUARLES. WESTERN PRESS COULD BE BLAMED FAR MORE THAN EAST. FOR EXAMPLE, AMERICAN AND UK PRESS. FRG REP SAID IT WAS NOT RELEVANT WHETHER HE LIKED OUTPUT OF RADIO MOSCOW, THE PRESENT LINE WAS NOT PRODUCTIVE OF WESTERN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. US REP SAID ONE THING WAS CRITICAL--PRESS TREATMENT OF THE PRESENT INFORMAL SESSIONS. HE CITED MARCH 1 AUSTRIAN PRESS STORY WHICH HAD BEEN EXPLICIT AND IN THE EASTERN SENSE. EASTERN REPS WERE PERFECTLY AWARE THAT ALLIED REPS WERE NOT BEHIND THIS. KHLESTOV SAID NEITHER WERE EASTERN REPS. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT ENOUGH HAD BEEN SAID ON SUBJECT TO MAKE POINT CLEAR.
79. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD NEXT SESSION AT 1515 HOURS ON MARCH 7. HUMES

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 MAR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA01932
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740365/aaaacjbl.tel
Line Count: 1911
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 35
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 26 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <02 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: MARCH 4 INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS
TAGS: PARM, XG, US, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005